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Abstract 
 
This article argues that many young people (11 to 19) in Europe articulate a construction 
of their identity that includes European element. This articulation is often initially made in 
instrumental terms, but through deliberative discussion can move to become more 
idealistic. The data is drawn from over 300 small discussion groups across 29 European 
countries, and it suggests that the ‘specific risks’ to European values described by the 
Council of Europe in 2011 are not held by the younger generation. Contemporary and 
local political events were used in discussion to construct ideas of Europe as representing, 
for them, a relatively unique phenomenon of a group of countries who they felt shared 
similar conceptions of human rights, and who sought to enforce them. These included the 
acceptance of diversity (in terms of sexuality, gender and ethnicity), of freedom of 
expression within particular limits, of the obligations of countries to organise social 
services, and of participation in democratic processes. Discussion groups were held over 
the 2010 to 2016 period. The methodology adopted was particularly non-directive, and 
each discussion moved according to the interests of the group, so no quantitative analysis 
of this phenomenon is possible; but the overall impression is of a generation of young 
people who largely express support for rights-based societies, and reject intolerance, 
nationalism and authoritarian behaviours. The methodology used may have potential 
pedagogic implications. 
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Young Europeans’ constructions of a Europe of Human Rights 
 
Alistair Ross 
 
Introduction and Context 
 
This article presents some findings of a personal post-retirement research project that I 
began in 2010 (Ross, 2015, 2019. Its purpose was to examine the ways in which young 
people in mainland Europe, between the ages of 11 and 19, constructed identities for 
themselves that might include such entities as their country and Europe. I visited over 104 
different towns, cities and villages (with populations between 500 and 13 million) in 29 
European countries, and in each engaged in discussions with small groups of 11 to 19 year 
old young people, talking with some two thousand of them in 324 conversations. I was 
working with the understanding that most people will not necessarily have firm and fixed 
senses of identity: the ways in which a person chooses to describe their identities will 
depend on the context in which they are engaged (Bauman, 2000; Bruter, 2005; Balescu, 
2009; Anthias, 2012).  
 
The concept of European citizenship, was initiated soon after the publication of the 
constructivist analyses of Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983) The status and implicit 
identity of European Citizenship was introduced by the European Union’s (EU) Maastrich 
Treaty in 1992: ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’ (CEC, 1982: Article 8 1). But 
there was little examination of what this might mean, either in the eyes of the 
Commission or the minds of these Europeans.  
There is some quantitative data suggesting that younger people generally were more 
positive about including a European element in their identity. The Eurobarometer opinion 
survey, conducted every six months for the European Commission in every state in the 
Union (and candidate states) since the mid 1970s has shown that more younger people 
describe themselves as either ‘European’ or as ‘European and their own country’ than of 
‘their country and European’ or as only of ‘their country’. This has been analysed by Lutz et 
al. (2006) to suggest that cohorts of people born more recently are less likely to adopt a 
solely national identity, and are more likely to express multiple (including European) 
identities: they concluded that there was ‘a strong and highly significant positive cohort 
effect’, which represented ‘long-term tectonic shifts in identity that are likely to have 
major and enduring consequence’ (Lutz et al., 2006: 425). 
 
The idea of a cohort effect is important: this means that the cohort will continue to act 
this way as they age (rather than change, as an effect of aging). Mary Fulbrook has used 
historical qualitative data to suggest that in the twentieth century German young people , 
formed as series of cohorts, each of which formed ‘a collective identity on the basis of 
generationally defined common experiences’ (Fulbrook, 2011: 11). Identities were 
constructed by each generation as the consequence of political fractures and dissonance 
in national society, and the age at which people experience key historical moments, such 
as the transitions within German society in 1933, 1945 and 1989, were a critical 
explanatory factor behind an individual or group’s ‘availability for mobilisation’ for 
political expression (ibid.: 488). 
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What these young Europeans talked about in the discussion groups, often extensively, 
were human rights issues, particularly with respect to the idea of European 
distinctiveness, and the analysis of this will be the main thrust of this article. This is also 
set in the context of the identification of ‘eight specific risks’ to Council of Europe (CoE) 
values indentified by a working party led by Joskcha Fischer in 2011 (Report of the Group 
… , 2011), established in response to concerns by European governments to real and 
perceived threats to social cohesion across Europe. The working party suggested that the 
following were threats to the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
especially to individual freedom and equality before the law: 
o rising intolerance 
o rising support for xenophobic and populist parties  
o discrimination 
o the presence of a population virtually without rights  
o parallel societies 
o Islamic extremism  
o loss of democratic freedoms; and  
o a possible clash between religious freedom and freedom of expression. 
 
Behind these, they suggested, were ‘insecurity (stemming from Europe’s economic 
difficulties and sense of relative decline); the phenomenon of large-scale immigration 
(both as actually experienced and as perceived); distorted images and harmful stereotypes 
of minorities in the media and public opinion; and a shortage of leaders who can inspire 
confidence’ (ibid.: 5). The data collected in this survey suggests that, for many young 
people these are equally issues of concern, but that they are attitudes which most of them 
reject, and that many perceive as being primarily held by older people.  
 
In order to explore what values young Europeans held, and what they thought that ‘being 
European’ means, a qualitative methodology seemed to be the most promising approach. 
 
Methodology  
  
Constructions of identities and the expression of values are social activities: they take 
place in social settings, and are contingent on the particular circumstances in which they 
are expressed. But young people of school age may be a particularly difficult group to ask 
questions of, not least because they are accustomed to much adult questioning being 
directed at testing their knowledge. Most questions put to young people in schools are 
closed: the questioner knows the answer, and the task of the young person is (if they are 
compliant) to demonstrate that they can provide a correct response.  
 
My approach was therefore to initiate small group deliberative discussions, where 
between five and eight young people would feel they controlled the subject, and could 
discuss issues with each other using their own vocabulary, rather than in response to my 
agenda and terminology. Group members would manage pace and direction. Open-ended 
questions, often made in response to what had been said, elicited their sense of 
attachment to their locality, country and other locations that might represent political 
identities. The apparent lack of structure was designed to capture and use the narratives 
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the young people themselves – for example, I would initial refer to ‘your country’, letting 
them (perhaps) introduce terms such as ‘state’ and ‘nation’, and only then inquiring what 
they meant by their terms, for examples and contexts. 
  
Group conversations (gruppendiskussionsverfahren: group discussion method) have been 
developed in German social science research over the past twenty years (Bohnsack ,2000; 
Loos and Schäffer, 2001). Described as ‘an open interview, intended to let respondents 
develop a topic in their own language, in their symbolic system and their relevant 
framework,’ the technique allows analysis that ‘avoid[s] projecting into single utterances 
meanings that are not appropriate (Bohnsack, 2000: 21, translated by Scheunpflug et al. 
2016). Gugglberger et al. (2015) suggest this as ‘a very open and flexible method of data 
generation … [I]n comparison to the more structured focus group’ (2015: 127). It is a 
process ‘in which respondents can set the structures and contents of the conversation by 
themselves’ Scheunpflug et al. (2016: 10), producing ‘conjunctive knowledge … implicit, 
action-guiding knowledge … based and acquired in fundamental experiences … that 
groups of individuals share with each other’ (Wagener 2018: 92). My method was to 
provide narrative-generating stimuli to initiate discussion, beginning with immanent issues 
- the topics, accounts and language that the group members use in their narratives - and 
only later moving to ask exmanent questions – my own agenda of themes, when they had 
had the opportunity to develop structures they found relevant.  
 
Groups were assured that there were no ‘right’ answers, and they should say if they 
disagreed with each other. This was to establish an empowering rapport, in which 
discussion was substantially directed and paced by group members. My strategies to 
generate such a dialogue were: 
 not to introduce leading terminology 
 to make questions transparently open (If they said they were French, I might 
respond ‘What makes you French?’) 
 to accept all responses as valid 
 where possible, to construct questions that responded to what had been said  
 to ask as few questions as possible 
 not to expect everyone to respond (not a sequential interview); and 
 to ask for examples. 
 
Most young people (about 95 per cent) made more than a minimal contribution: two 
thirds could be described as fully participant for the entire session. The conversations 
were varied in focus and emphasis, and my questions changed in response, and in their 
wording, in order to maintain a conversational rather than an interrogatory mode.  While I 
had areas that I wanted to explore, the interactive nature of the discussion made 
responses difficult to quantify. The majority of discussions were in English, the others 
simultaneously translated by my local colleague.  
 
I used my networks and contacts in European universities to assemble small groups of 
young people in 104 locations. Each of my contacts who was able to cooperate was asked 
to identify two schools or colleges in their locality who would cooperate, one from a 
working class district, one from a middle class district.  generally, two groups, from classes 
of different ages, were recruited, asking for about six to eight young people, half female, 
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of different ages, who were willing to participate and discuss issues. They were asked not 
for the most or least able students, and to select from the population of the school, not 
just formal citizens, including where possible an appropriate representation of any 
minorities.   
 
My first phase of fieldwork (2010-12) covered the countries that had joined the EU after 
2004: a second phase (2014-16) added many of the pre-2004 members. At least two 
places were visited in each country, and four or more in the larger countries (Greece and 
the United Kingdom were not included). The young people participating were diverse: 
some 56 per cent were female, about half had parents in working class occupations. There 
were minority-origin young people in many discussion groups, reflecting the distribution 
of minorities in each country and Europe as a whole: by country of origin, 77 per cent had 
parents and grandparents from the country they were living in: of the remainder, 7.4 per 
cent had at least one parent/grandparent from another EU country, 8.4 per cent from a 
European country not in the EU, and 7.4 per cent from outside Europe (figures based on 
what was volunteered in discussion). This was not intended to be a statistically 
representative sample, but a range of potential views across each country: from different 
regions, social backgrounds and cultural origins. 
 
Ethical approval was given by the Faculty Research Ethics Committee of my former 
institution (London Metropolitan University) in 2009 and 2014, and were (for the first 
phase) based on the British Educational Research Association’s Revised Ethical Guidelines 
for Educational Research (BERA, 2004) or (for the second phase) on the subsequent set of 
guidelines (BERA, 2011) Consent was obtained from school principals, and written consent 
from the young people’s parents (all of those under 16, and older in some countries) and 
the young people themselves. Letters to parents, in the national language, explained that I 
was ‘making a small study of young people’s ideas . . . about how they feel as part of their 
community, region and country’, and gave details of my local colleague for further 
information, and specifying that they could withdraw from the study at any stage.  All 
names used here are pseudonyms. 
 
 
 
Much empirical social science research draws subjects from a narrow base: Arnett (2008) 
estimates that 80 per cent of non-USA studies are drawn from psychology undergraduates 
in the capital city of a country. These are extrapolated as representative of the country 
(Rozin. 2001). Within the constraints that the population being sampled was of young 
residents of these European countries (largely industrialised, democratic and 
comparatively rich), the recruitment process was designed to avoid the pitfalls analysed 
by Henrich et al. (2010). Further, the study was designed to uncover the range and 
diversity of opinion, rather than to arrive at a generalised summary of young people’s 
opinions.  Bourdieu was critical of the assumption that opinions and beliefs could be 
statistically summarised: he argued ‘public opinion is an artifact, pure and simple, whose 
function is to conceal that the state of opinion at a given moment of time is a system of 
forces and tensions. There is nothing more inadequate to represent the state of opinion 
than a percentage’ (Bourdieu, 1973: 1295, emphasis as in original). He observed that not 
everyone has an opinion on every issue, that the simple summation of what opinions are 
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expressed only produces ‘meaningless artifacts’ (ibid.: 1292), and that using an identical 
question with all respondents implies that there must be a consensus about the validity of 
the issue that is being addressed. Rochat points out that ‘in academia, a priori claims of 
universality sell better than diversity, which complicates rather than simplifies matters … 
This tends to relegate diversity to noise rather than as a primary object of study’ (Rochat, 
2010: 107). This study was intentionally noisy, reflecting the diverse populations of these 
countries. , and to explore the particular issues of concern the participants raised about 
their political identities, in the vocabulary and terms that they raised. 
 
Findings: A Europe of Human Rights  
 
Each discussion began with members describing what they had in common: often this 
might be that they were (for example) French (or Algerian, Moroccan, etc.). I would then 
ask why they were French (etc.), which led to talk of birthplace, parents’ and 
grandparents’ identities, language, upbringing, culture and more. Identities were often 
described as mixed, and were held for multiple reasons. For most, their ‘nationality’ was 
seen as accidental. In Sevilla, Sancho ( M 14) described his citizenship as ‘a lottery’, while 
in Prilep, Lazar ( M 18) said they were ‘Macedonians, but not by choice – we are unlucky to 
be born here’. Alida ( F 16) felt lucky to born in the Netherlands: ‘if I was born in Syria, I 
would be running away from that’. Being born as citizens of a particular state is today like 
a feudal inheritance that preserves wealth and privilege (Shachar, 2009). For only a few 
young people was their country identity essentialised: Janko ( M 15), living in Slagelse 
(Denmark), said ‘I’m Serbian … if I marry a Serbian girl, [my children] will be Serbian’.  
 
A significant minority, particularly in the Nordic countries, were antipathetic to the 
concept of nationality. In Stockholm, Saga ( F  16) said ‘Swedish is nothing more than my 
passport says that I’m Swedish’, and Margreta (16) added she was concerned about being 
seen as ‘Swedish’: ‘there’s this nationalistic movement … I don’t want to be whatsoever 
identified with … it’s become important to not identify myself with where I live, or where 
people are from’. 
 
Were there aspects of this country-identity that they were pleased about? (Often not a 
great deal.) Were there things about the country they were less proud of, that they would 
like to change? This usually provoked a longer and more voluble discussion. Many points 
made were contingent on the particular location and specific moment. In countries that 
had joined the EU post-2004 they raised issues of corruption, or in the Baltic states 
uncertainties about Russian intentions in the wake of the incursions in Georgia and the 
Ukraine; while in western states there were concerns about racism, xenophobia and the 
position of refugees (particularly in discussions in the later half of 2015 and early 2016). 
For example, in the Croatian town of Zadar a group talked of the recent television 
appearance of the former Prime Minister (and local politician), Ivo Sanader, who was the 
subject of corruption changes; and in Malmö they discussed the behaviour of the local 
right-wing Swedish Democrat candidate in the elections a month earlier.  
 
I then moved the conversations on, to talk about if they thought their views were also 
held by other people in the country – of different generations, of different provinces. 
Older people, particularly in newer EU states, were often seen as bound by what they saw 
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as old-fashioned ways of thinking. For example, in Warszawa (Poland) a group suggested 
older people were nationalist and Catholic, because this had been a form of resistance to 
Soviet hegemony in the 1945-89 period: now these young people, all born after this, saw it 
as no longer relevant. Sergiusz ( M 16) said that then ‘it was something important – 
religion mattered. Now, religion doesn’t matter so much in the younger generation’. He 
attributed this to both cosmopolitan influences and to the ‘problems of concern to this 
generation, such as homophobia and euthanasia’. 
 
In the western counties, older people were often described as racist. In København Alvilda 
( F 18) complained about her parents’ racist jokes: ’I don’t think they realise that they are 
being racist … it’s just the way that [they were] brought up’. In Roubaix (France) Colette ( F 
18, Congolese born) blamed racist attitudes on family ‘indoctrination … from when you 
are born your family keeps repeating that Black people are not good’. There were also 
expressions of racism by a minority of young people. 
  
Many saw themselves as having agency in changing matters. In Frascati (Italy) Lamberto ( 
M 16) argued ‘we can change the world, because government is what we are – if we 
change on stupid things like racism or corruption … It isn’t just a problem of government, 
it is our problem’. In Wien (Austria) some young people had voted the day before the 
discussion (some for the first time; the franchise is open to 16 year olds). Cordula ( F 16) 
argued that while voting was significant, ‘you can make much more change than through 
voting if you go on the street and demonstrate. I do this – the next one’s on Friday, and 
it’s the right-wing party’s ball in Vienna, the Akademikerball – I’ll be there!’ This was a 
reference to an annual pan-European gathering of right-wing parties and organisation.  
 
Their country identity, as expressed in these discussions, was usually constructed with 
some affection and understanding, but in the great majority of cases as non-nationalistic 
(cf Anderson, 1992). After talking about this for perhaps 25 to 30 minutes, I intervened to 
shift the focus of the discussion: as well as these feelings of attachment (or not) to a 
country, did they also, sometimes, feel that they were European in any way? 
 
The conversations that followed were often initially unfocussed and disconnected. There 
were uncertainties about whether there was a shared European culture. Some at first 
denied that European society had any defining characteristics. Initially they often talked 
about differences between the food, cultures and histories of other countries. But often, 
as the discussions progressed, a spectrum of constructs of the meaning of Europe 
emerged, and very often there was a particular spectrum of constructs, that emerged in a 
particular sequence.  
 
A few regarded the term European as a simply ascribed characteristic: they lived in a land 
mass called Europe, ergo they were European; their country was located in Europe, they 
were therefore a European. In Sevilla, Salvador ( M 15) said ‘you feel Spanish because you 
are born in Andalucía; Spain belongs to Europe, so – if you are from Spain, you feel 
European’.  
 
Instrumental reasons were often the first reasons suggested: the freedom to travel, study 
and work were often cited, particularly in the post-2004 member states: Afina in Oradea ( 
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F 15) wanted ‘to go to study somewhere other than Romania - in Austria, for example’. 
The experience of travel seemed to confirm this sense of knowing other Europeans. In 
Warszawa Bartosz ( M 12), having travelled a little, found he now ‘could go to Germany, 
move around, feel connected. I can go everywhere in Europe and know what to do there’. 
This instrumentalism was not only at the personal level: European support for disaster 
relief was mentioned, and the enhanced prospects member states had for economic 
growth. In Skopje, Vasil ( M 16) said EU membership would improve growth in Macedonia, 
and Petrunka ( F 14) felt with joining ‘the standard will rise … if we are in the Union more 
and more will start – we will be much richer’. 
 
Membership of European institutions also brought a sense of security. In Faro, Andréia ( F 
17) saw her European identity as a form of security for a small country: she said ‘our 
identity cards say we are from Europe … I am a Portuguese citizen, but I am also a 
European citizen – that’s important – it makes us feel [that] we matter in the world’. 
Feeling part of a larger community was comforting, both to those in relatively small 
countries such as the Netherlands, where Aat ( M 16) said ‘I think I’m European – the time 
of small little countries running their own [things] is a bit over – Europe is one big country 
that works together’, and to those in much larger states such as Germany, where Hans ( M 
18) said ‘Europe is the future of this continent to living in peace, without war’. 
 
There were also some very specific mentions of a sense of European solidarity in late 
January 2015. Sylviane ( F 16), in Frascati: ‘I have to say I really felt European after what 
happened in Charlie Hebdo, because of the union that this created among Europeans’; and 
in another Italian group Karine ( F 16) said ‘at this particular moment, I feel very European, 
after what happened in France’. Europe was a place that was safe: later in 2015 Tatiania ( 
F 14) in Faro spoke of ‘feeling European, it’s kind of feeling safe in our place, like in our 
home’. 
 
This instrumental view of Europe very often shifted as the discussion progressed. For 
example, in Luxembourg Amaury ( M 17) began by saying ‘the greatest good that the 
European Union gave us is free circulation – this suppression of the borders is a gift’. But a 
few minutes later he reflected further: ‘It’s also a thing of values, because in the European 
Union we should share all the same values – democracy, and liberty, liberty of expression, 
and that’s also what the European Union stands for’, and still later, ‘I think the main right 
is democracy – we see in Poland the big reaction by the European community because 
there liberty of expression was partly suppressed. We have this sense of democracy in 
common, because of this reaction’. His reference was to the recent EU review of the 
Polish Government’s possible violation of the standards of rule of law (Pop, 2015). 
Amaury’s view of the EU’s significance shifted over fifteen minutes, from enabling 
passport-less travel to a power that could sanction anti-democratic tendencies in a 
member state. 
 
Another example came in the small Swiss town of Hombrechtikon, Danilo ( M 14) began by 
describing Europe as ‘different countries that agree on certain issues, in commerce and 
business. His colleague Bianka ( F 12) then talked about Russia, and Danilo described 
Russians as ‘not free to say what they want, and Europe there’s freedom of opinion … 
every country that wants to join should comply with the rules and laws of the European 
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Union’. Why had he had moved from economic aspects to human rights? ‘Now that I think 
about it, human rights are more important’. 
 
A further example was Loes ( F 17) in Brussels, who talked herself into being European. 
She began: ‘I don’t feel European – I guess that we have advantages in that it is easier to 
travel, I like that … so it is easier’. A few minutes later: ‘I think that Europe has this 
common goal … to make Europe a better place, where everyone has equal rights. I don’t 
think that we are there yet’. Then a colleague suggested that Putin was not very 
democratic: Loes exploded: ‘not very democratic? I think Putin is not democratic at all –
the complete opposite of what we want to do with the European Union – that would be 
the end, all people who are not straight will be prosecuted … it would tear the European 
Union apart’.  
 
In the newer member states, such as those in the Balkan states, there were similar shifts. 
Most still felt that they were not really European. Their liminal status that was partly a 
matter of geography (in many discussions, Europe was to the west, and the Balkans – 
‘non-Europe’ - to the east), and partly a matter of time (‘we are not yet European’). For 
example, in Iași in north-eastern Romania, Cristian ( M 16) began by conceding that he was 
only European ‘technically, on paper. We can’t compare ourselves of European countries 
like Germany, England … we aren’t in the same bracket’. Later, he elaborated: it was a 
matter of money, but also of being efficient and living conditions: a colleague said ‘In 
Romania, no one helps you – in Germany, if someone has a problem, the state helps’. 
Cristian then discussed Russia’s relationship with Europe: Russia had a ‘habit of exploiting 
other countries … we Europeans don’t do this any more’. The group all agreed: I asked 
about the expression ‘we Europeans’. The explicit shift was explained; ‘we incline to be 
more Europeanish than Russian, We evolved towards the European’.  
 
Europe often became defined by its stand on human rights. In Bernalda, a small town in 
the south of Italy, Maïté ( M 19) proclaimed ‘I’m a European citizen because I have the 
same political rights as the others – that’s important, people are equal before the law’. In 
İstanbul, two young Kurdish men were sure that their rights would be respected if they 
lived in the EU: Furkan ( M 17) said ‘when you say “Europe”, it reminds me first of human 
rights, and of great possibilities for freedom’.  
 
It was not only that human rights had been established in Europe, but that the EU was 
active in ensuring that they were upheld. In Lille, a long discussion on rights was peppered 
with references to recent examples and violations. Pascaline ( F 15) suggested that Turkey 
could not join the EU till they recognised the Ottoman role in the Armenian genocide. 
Laurence ( M 16) raised the attempt by the Hungarian Prime Minister to re-introduce the 
death penalty in Hungary, and how the European Commission had frustrated this: ‘that’s a 
nice aspect of Europe, that he had to abandon it because … he would have been 
sanctioned by Europe.’ Blaise ( M 15) recalled earlier EU diplomatic sanctions against the 
Austrian politician Jörg Haider; ‘he took away some rights of homosexuals … but the EU 
was there to restrain him – it’s like a dog leash’. 
 
It was the process of discussion itself that appeared to lead to this transformation towards 
collectively defining Europe as having a distinctive, sometimes unique, and valued political 
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culture that focussed on social and political rights. The context of this turn was often 
contingent on comparisons made with authoritarian regimes and with neo-liberal states 
such as the USA. These othering processes, which led to a more tautly-defined sense of 
positively ‘being European’, centred on the recognition of a distinctive and shared 
approach to human rights. 
 
Findings: Young Europeans and the threats to European Convention on Human Rights 
 
It will be clear from the foregoing that the risks to European values that were raised by the 
Council of Europe in 2011 ( Report of the Group …, 2011) were also seen as significant 
issues by a substantial number of young people, across most of Europe. They were seen as 
dangerous trends, but also as ones that they tended to associate primarily with some 
members of a different and older generation and, less often, with some of the population 
living in more rural areas or smaller settlements. They also tended to be able to marshal 
arguments of resistance to these threats, and so see that there was an imperative to do 
this.  
 
The key argument in the CoE report was that 
… identities are a voluntary matter for the individual concerned, and that no one 
should be forced to choose or accept one primary identity to the exclusion of 
others. … European societies need to embrace diversity, and accept that one can 
be a “hyphenated European” … But this can work only if all long-term residents are 
accepted as citizens and if all, whatever their faith, culture or ethnicity, are treated 
equally by the law, the authorities and their fellow citizens. Like all other citizens in 
a democracy they should have a say in making the law, but neither religion nor 
culture can be accepted as an excuse for breaking it.  
(Report of the Group…, 2011: 5) 
 
Young people’s responses to each of the ‘eight threats’ are analysed in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
There were many instances where the existence of intolerance was recognised. Generally 
– but by no means universally - young people in the groups wanted to counter 
intolerance. Sometimes this was rather unsophisticated. For example in Helsinki, when 
Kaia (16), a locally-born young woman of Somali parentage, said she encountered a lot of 
prejudice, Vilhelm ( M 18) was unsure. ‘People say that there is so much racism – I have 
been expecting to see this … so that I could fight back … but I don’t see it’. Aune ( F 16) 
gently reproved him: ‘If you are part of a minority you will see it better. If you are white 
and Finnish no one will talk to you like that’. When Kaia detailed the abuse (from ‘usually 
women, especially older ones, not young people’) Vilhelm was visibly shocked.  
 
The negative response of some countries and individuals to the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’ 
provoked specific references to fundamental European values. In Madrid, Jaime ( M 11) 
said ‘now I feel less European … all the continent should work in a group.’ In Paris, Albane 
( F 17) said that European identity was threatened ‘when some counties of Europe close 
their borders. At this time I don’t feel European’. and, in a rural school near Montpellier, 
Amandine ( F 15) burst out ‘I feel less European – we can’t be proud of what has 
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happened – what Hungary is doing now is not human’, Lola ( F 15) agreed with passion: 
‘Europe is one – but the unity is destroyed – Hungary is not respecting the principles – 
Europe says we should help refugees’. 
  
There was also intolerance on the part of some young people. In the small Belgian town of 
Torhout (in a very monoethnic area) two members of a group strongly criticised migrants. 
Aart ( M 16) wanted to ‘close the borders … most immigrants come with a mindset that 
“Belgium has to change for me” – and it’s not the way it goes. They don’t like the culture, 
so they try to change Belgium’. Pim ( M 16) gave an example: ‘they want to build their 
church [mosque] on our grounds … we have a normal Christian church’. I challenged this, 
pointing out that Belgium had built churches in its colonies: Pim responded ‘Belgium 
occupied the colonies, so had the right to do what they want … we are still above them’. 
Art added ‘They are trying to change the complete western world to their ideology’.  
 
There was a particular perception of racial difference among some young people in the 
Visegrád countries, where there was stereotyping of Africans as undeveloped and 
primitive. Europe was sometimes characterised as ‘white’: in Banská Bystrica in Slovakia, 
Iven ( M 14) said there were no Black people in Europe, and then corrected himself: ‘well, 
there are some, immigrants’. He then sorted the continents by diet: ‘American have fast 
food, African have what they can find, Indians have bamboos and plant roots, and 
Europeans have normal food’. Hedviga ( F 13) said ‘a European … has a white skin colour, 
who looks like me’. Lenka ( F 16) talked of migrants: ‘if you go to Paris, you’ll see more 
migrants than Europeans … A typical European [is] white, like me’. But there were 
alternative narratives: in Olsztyn (Poland), Maigozata G ( F 12) referred to ‘racists who are 
against others who have a different colour of skin’. 
 
There was much criticism of xenophobic and populist parties. Margareta in Stockholm 
was quoted above: she did not want to be identified with Sweden specifically because of 
the rising ‘nationalistic movement [Sverigedemokratern], and patriotism growing 
stronger’.  
 
There was fairly detailed knowledge of the racist parties, their leaders and policies in most 
countries in western Europe: this was frequently described and critiqued on a country-
wide basis, rather than a European one (as xenophobic parties, this is perhaps 
unsurprising). In the Netherlands, for example, Aalderik ( M 16) disapproved of Gert 
Wilders and the Partij voor de Vrijheid ‘who want no one to come in. I am Dutch, but I am 
also a human being, and I like it more to be human than Dutch, because we are all people, 
humans’. In Vevey (Switzerland), Bénédicte ( F 18) described the ‘big problem’ of the 
Union démocratique du centre’s describing migrants as ‘“black sheep” – trying to get all 
foreigners to go away’. In the town of Roubaix (the most deprived commune in France, 
Maurin and Mazery, 2014), Jacques ( M 18, of partly African origin) said that even if he had 
‘a French surname, I would be métis [mixed race]: the Front Nationale party want to 
accept just French people, not others – this party is quite racist … I am French because I 
was born here – but this party judge people by their origins’. Colette ( F 17, of Congolese 
birth and descent) said that for the FN ‘French means the colour of the skin, not the ID 
card’. 
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There was often an acute awareness of discrimination, particularly with respect to the 
absence or denial of rights: about both policies beyond and within Europe.  For example, in 
many countries the United States was criticised for racial discrimination, particularly by 
the police – this was at the time when the Black Lives Matter campaign was at its height.  
 
Discrimination against LBGT communities in Russia was seen as a particular issue: in 
Slagelse (Denmark), Nelly ( F 15) said in Russia ‘they don’t have the right to be homosexual 
– they can be arrested for it, actually. It’s not in the laws of all [European Union] countries 
yet … It is very important that the European Union has human rights, the basic rights to be 
yourself’. In Zagreb, Dragan ( M 14) used the acceptance of gay rights as a marker of 
European behaviour, arguing that although Croatia (at the time of our discussion about to 
join the European Union) ‘will never be on that level of European society’, because of anti-
gay discrimination. Changes in attitudes were often seen generationally: in Córdoba, 
Agustina ( F 17) said older people ‘don’t understand or respect homosexual people, they 
see it as strange.’ In Malmö, Sarah ( F 16) described coming out to her mother, who 
initially response was ‘”Well, I hope you don’t marry a girl, because that won’t be 
acceptable!” … when she was younger … they grew up in a whole different perspective’. 
But there were also some young people who were against LGBT rights. The absence of 
capital punishment in Europe was contrasted with the United States; in Akureyri (Iceland), 
Katrín ( F 17) saw capital punishment as a civic rights issue: ‘I don’t like that about 
America, and that’s what I like about Europe, the death sentence isn’t allowed’. Social 
security was also often perceived of as a European value. In Hannover, Jule ( F 13) 
contrasted Europe’s compulsory medical insurance – ‘in the United States – there you 
don’t have to be’, and Anke ( F 15) to ‘unemployment benefit – in the USA they don’t have 
this security’. In Bellaterra, Ordoño ( M 17) referred to ‘the European dream … the most 
important things are social rights, to help each other’. 
 
There was also – sometimes – acceptance of the presence of populations virtually 
without rights, who became, in effect, parallel societies. Such groups included both non-
European migrants, but particularly the Roma and Sinti populations. In many eastern 
European countries, there was widespread criticism by young people of the Roma. In 
Romania young non-Roma said that Roma damaged the reputation of the country: in Iaşi, 
Dumitru ( M 14) said he didn’t feel European ‘because the other countries in Europe think 
we are gypsies, that we do all the bad things in Europe’. Jaen argued ( M 17) that the Roma 
themselves were responsible: ‘they …are the ones who trigger that attitude from us, 
because they are the ones who have misconduct.’ These factors led to the ultimate 
othering, a denial that the local Roma were Romanian. Dumitru said that although they 
had Romanian passports, ‘they are not really Romanians.’ There were other examples of 
othering. In Ostrava, in the Czech Republic, one group listed the full trope of anti-ziganist 
characteristics (Kligman 2001): local Roma were migrants to the city, had been rehoused 
in new homes, had large families for whom they claimed welfare, did not belong to the 
Czech Republic, were trouble-makers, not ‘normal’, stealing, damaging civic property, 
doing tokenistic work, being vulgar, and had not adjusted to the majority. The courts were 
thought to be biased in favour of the Roma: Vavrinec ( M 16) said ‘when a Roma injures a 
Czech person, I mean a white person, it doesn’t mean anything – but when it’s vice versa 
it’s really a bad situation’. 
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But there were also some more positive and sympathetic comments. In Paris Aimée ( F 16) 
said ‘the biggest discrimination is against Roms people. Roms are ordinary people like us … 
we are all the same’. In Sofija, Aleksandar ( M 13) criticised his grandfather, who blamed 
the Roma for all of Bulgaria’s problems. Teodor agreed: ‘the Roma are not bad people – 
people from all groups who make problems’. The exclusion of some minority populations 
was of widespread concern. In Haslev, Troels ( M 18) spoke of the growing exclusion of 
‘foreign people in Denmark, and especially the Muslim[s] – which I don’t like. Danish 
people [are] not very open-minded to people they don’t know’. Luxembourg had a 
particularly diverse population, welcomed by most young people, but Ludovic ( M 14; 
father from Cape Verde) observed ‘in Europe there are not so many people that are Black, 
they treat me as though I have no value, as an African’.  
 
Muslims were sometimes stereotyped as Islamic extremists. For example, in a discussion 
in the small town of Vevey, in the Swiss Romande, Julien ( M 15, Swiss-born of Kurdish 
origin, with a French forename) pointed to divisions over religion in Switzerland, Isaac 
denied this: ‘we have Catholic, Protestant, Jews equally, and the Swiss people really 
respect these different religions’. Julien (not a practising Muslim) pointed to a 
constitutional ban on the construction of minarets, and on face veils in public areas in one 
Canton. Isaac ( M 14) responded as Aart had in Belgium: ‘if they come to Switzerland they 
have to adapt to the Swiss rules – or bear the consequences’.  
 
The potential for offending religious groups was a particular issue in 2015, after the 
Charlie Hebdo killings in Paris. In Faro, opinions were divided: Imaculada ( F 17) thought 
that if ‘you are offending someone’s religion, it’s not just a cartoon – it’s a religion, with 
history and beliefs, not something for you to make fun of,’ while Andréia ( F 17) said of 
Charlie Hebdo ‘the thing about those journals is that they criticise all of the religions – 
they don’t take sides. And when people don’t take sides, it’s OK to criticise and say that 
your religion is stupid. And that’s their opinion, OK?’ There was also discussion in 
København of the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy of 2005: Laura ( F 17) 
said they ‘weren’t typical Danish humour, they weren’t really funny … I don’t think that 
was respecting the other people’s culture, that was over the line’. Ulla ( F 17) pointed out 
that the Danes value the freedom of speech very highly, so ‘people can joke a little about 
each other’s religion. Well, the cartoons were maybe a little out of hand’. 
 
There was much discussion on threats to democratic freedoms, and of the potential clash 
between religious freedom and freedom of expression. Humanitarian values and rights 
were frequently mentioned as characteristics of Europe. Hans ( M 18), in Dortmund, said 
‘the thing that is big for Europe is that you have human rights, you can say whatever you 
want, that we all have this freedom … for us it is normal that they exist - this is not 
standard in other countries - often we really don’t think how good it is to have all these … 
the right to vote, the right to free speech, press freedom, to leave the country, to say 
critical things, the right of the courts – these are the most important rights that we have 
achieved in Europe’. 
 
In Lille, Pascaline ( F 15) gave a narrative of how civic right had spread eastwards from 
western Europe after 1989: ‘in France these are values that are so deep – human rights, 
liberties, democracy – these are the foundations of our society. Europe shared those 
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values – but the newer the countries, the less these values are really shared – it’s a good 
job that Europe has the power to bring these values to other countries’. There were 
similar sentiments, and memories of fascism, in Agustín’s ( M 15) remarks in Madrid: 
‘Spain has a confident feeling and feels very European … we are Europeans because we 
share the same rights and freedoms’. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The ‘eight specific risks’ to social cohesion across Europe Council of Europe (CoE) values 
identified by Fischer’s working party in 2011, whether real or perceived threats, provide a 
useful checklist against which values can be identified and analysed. This paper has used 
them to categorise and evaluate the various issues that were thrown up by groups of 
young people when they were asked to identify aspects of their country (and Europe) 
about which they were satisfied, and others that would like to change, and were less 
happy about.  The extent to which these issues were thus unforced, but generated by 
their own deliberations, is thus significant.   
 
It was particularly evident that many groups were very specific about events that had 
taken place in the relatively recent past, or (less often) were specifically local.  The 
contingency that this suggests does not mean that they were only responsive to live 
issues, to the immediate, but that they used current events to substantiate their 
arguments and beliefs.  Moreover, the fact that the Fischer list was so frequently checked 
suggests that his working party had some prescience.  The timescale of the fieldwork in 
many of the western European states was such that it coincided with political events that 
these concerns about these risks were being articulated by some people, and particularly 
politicians in a way that sparked opposition from many young people. For example, 
Finland, Sweden and Norway were the location of fieldwork in September 2014, three 
months after the Islamic State of the Levant (Daesh) had proclaimed itself;  Austria, Italy 
and Switzerland were studied in late January/early February 2015, a few weeks after the 
Charlie Hebdo killings in Paris; the Netherlands, Belgium and parts of France in June 2015, 
as the refugee ‘crisis’ accelerated; and in more of France and Spain and Portugal in 
September, after the Hungarian erection of the fence; and the final fieldwork in other 
parts of Norway and Denmark, Germany and Luxembourg in January 2015 (just after the 
New Year incidents in Köln).   
 
In the context of Fischer’s list, what is important is that so many of the young peoples’ 
comments can be matched to these various elements. Quotations from the various 
discussion groups have been given to as to give value to the ideas of the young people 
themselves in as direct a way as possible. Taken together, they show young people 
exploring together issues that they often appeared unused to discussing – although many 
of them expressed their enjoyment in participating in these sessions. Kamilia ( F 15) in 
Kraków said ‘if we are to learn here in school, then we should talk about this! I miss it’, and 
in the Czech Republic Oldrich ( M 12) said ‘we should not learn about these issues, rather 
we should discuss them.’  
 
Taken together, the contributions suggest that young people are not apolitical or 
uninterested in current affairs, which is a common criticism of young people (Melo and 
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Stockemer, 2014; Amnå and Elkman, 2014; Foa and Mounk, 2016). Their concerns are very 
much rooted in the present, and in their own particular context: but this in itself is hardly 
surprising, and would be equally true of many older people.  
 
The data suggests that most young Europeans have multiple and shifting identities, that 
are contingent on the context of their discussion, and they are comfortable and at ease 
with this shifting diversity. This includes, very often, a resistance to the essentialism of 
nationalism and of racism. There is a concern for human rights and the denial of rights: 
and their focus is much more on rights being denied, that have to be fought for now, that 
for rights that have been achieved in the past. Their acceptance of multiple and shifting 
identities, and of what the CoE report refers to as ‘hyphenated Europeans’ (Report of the 
Group … 2011, 5, 34), stems largely from their experience of diversity in school. In the 
large Danish town of Haslev, Troels ( M 18) recalled when he had moved to his current 
school two years earlier: 
 
I grew up in the countryside, where we didn’t have any immigrants … then I came 
to the Gymnasium, and suddenly there are lots of them. At the start – I had some 
prejudices against some of them … they matched the way I had seen them look on 
the news, like the ‘immigrant criminal’ ... I started [by] thinking about them as 
what I’d seen through the media, but experiencing being with them as normal 
human beings … gave a lot to me. 
 
This does seem to support Allport’s contact theory of the reduction of intergroup 
prejudice (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). 
 
This generation of young Europeans, born since the early 1990s, appears to have 
distinctive characteristics in their attachment to human rights: they have, as Fulbrook puts 
it of generation differences between Germans in the twentieth century, to be in the 
process of the ‘construction of a collective identity on the basis of generationally defined 
common experiences’ (2011:11). Three particular sets of common experiences are 
significant. Firstly, the changing demographics of Europe. Agafiței and Ivan analysed 
Eurostat data and concluded that ‘in 2014, a little more than a fifth of EU households 
included at least one immigrant, regardless of migration generation or migration 
background’ (Agafiței and Ivan 2016:1). This is reflected in the participants in this study, in 
which at least 23 per cent were of full or partial foreign descent. This level of diversity is of 
very recent origin, other than in German, France and the UK: in most other European 
countries parents would have been much less likely to encounter diversity in their 
schooling, and grandparents highly unlikely. The second change for this generation has 
been in the political context, with the end of the Cold War, which has particularly affected 
generational perspectives in the states that have joined the EU since 2004. And the third 
change has been the rise of the social media, and particular their use by young people. 
 
The significance of this study may lie particularly in the methodology: the opportunity to 
talk in small groups, in a neutral situation, with a leader who very rarely asks leading 
questions, who does not always stay neutral, but allows a range of voices, who listens and 
responds to their points. Deliberation nearly always seemed to progress over the hour or 
so, and they appeared to enjoyed it, participate and listen. By giving credence and value to 
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their ideas, and letting them use and advance their own vocabulary, not reacting to adult-
prompted terms and categorisations, deliberative discussions can allow and encourage 
young people to develop their ideas from the instrumental to the idealistic.  The comments 
made in nearly all the groups suggests that this was rarely done. 
 
Could deliberative discussions be promoted in schools? The process is time-consuming, 
involving small groups, and would probably require some significant training. More 
particularly, it would be seen as controversial by some schools and teachers, and 
particularly by parents and policy makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deleted: But the process can lead to some remarkable 
observations and insights by young people. To 
conclude with an example: this is Olesia, a 12 year old 
girl living in Kraków, Poland, who said that in Europe¶
¶
everywhere you go you are surrounded by your 
friends, people from the same group - I can go 
anywhere, to any country and they would know you 
are from Poland, that you are from Europe. They don’t 
know you, but they know you – you are like a distant 
relative. Being European means that everywhere you 
have neighbours … In Europe, everyone has 
awareness, they know about each other, where each 
country is. We are a part of Europe – and that means 
something. … every country in the European Union 
needs to respect rights, and the rules. [They] shouldn’t 
think of themselves as better than the others: they 
shouldn’t spoil the organisation.¶
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